SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Henri Tajfel

Department of Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1HH, England

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Intergroup relations represent in their enormous scope one of the most difficult and complex knots of problems which we confront in our times. This is why their study in social psychology (and in other disciplines) has been more a matter of "approaches" or perspectives than of tight theoretical articulations.

Intergroup behavior will be understood in this chapter in terms proposed by Sherif (1966): "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of

1I wish to express my gratitude to Margaret Wetherell for her work on the initial stages of the preparation of this review, to Penny Oakes for making available to me an unpublished review of the literature on the salience of intergroup categorization, and to Alma Foster for her invaluable help in the presentation of the material.
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Their group identification, we have an instance of intergroup behavior” (p. 12). This definition needs to be anchored to its two underlying concepts: “group” and “group identification.”

A “group” can be defined as such on the basis of criteria which are either external or internal. External criteria are the “outside” designations such as bank clerks, hospital patients, members of a trades union, etc. Internal criteria are those of “group identification.” In order to achieve the stage of “identification,” two components are necessary, and one is frequently associated with them. The two necessary components are: a cognitive one, in the sense of awareness of membership; and an evaluative one, in the sense that this awareness is related to some value connotations. The third component consists of an emotional investment in the awareness and evaluations.

The empirical reality of the internal criteria is a necessary condition for the existence of a group in the psychological sense of the term; but it is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of intergroup behavior. There can be no intergroup behavior unless there is also some “outside” consensus that the group exists. But this in turn cannot be a sufficient condition since a classification by others of some people as a group does not necessarily mean that the individuals so classified have acquired an awareness of a common group membership and the value connotations associated with it. We shall adopt a definition of “group identification” as consisting of the two (and sometimes three) internal components referred to above; and a conjunctive definition of a “group” as requiring a combination of some external criteria with the internal criteria.

The 1970s have seen a revival of interest in intergroup behavior. Several recent reviews varying in their scope are now available (e.g. LeVine & D. Campbell 1972, Ehrlich 1973, Kidder & Stewart 1975, Billig 1976, Austin & Worchel 1979, Turner & Giles 1981) of which Billig’s is the most extensive in its historical and critical coverage.

The general emphasis of most of the work done since Allport (1954) wrote his classic integration of research on prejudice is reflected in the very first paragraph of the review by Ehrlich (1973):

Two types of theory are required to explain the state of ethnic group relations in a society. One must be a theory of intergroup behavior, sociological in orientation and using for its evidence materials that are primarily historical. The other theory is social psychological. Its concern is primarily cognitive factors and the relations of these factors with the interpersonal behavior of individuals (p. vii).

These views represent a considerable narrowing of scope as compared with the range of issues that Allport (1954) attempted to cover 20 years earlier. Is it justifiable to establish a dichotomy between a “theory of intergroup behavior” which must remain “sociological” and “historical” as
constrained with a "social psychological theory" which is focused upon cognition and interpersonal behavior? As Sherif (1966) wrote: "Our claim is the study of relations between groups and intergroup attitudes of their respective members. We therefore must consider both the properties of the groups themselves and the consequences of membership for individuals. Otherwise, whatever we are studying, we are not studying intergroup problems" (p. 62).

The plan of this review will reflect in its sequence the transition from "individual" to "group" approaches. We shall start with research concerned with individual processes in their direct applications to intergroup behavior. The remainder of the review will concentrate on the effects that group membership has on intergroup behavior; i.e. it will be concerned with research in which individuals are considered as members of groups rather than as self-contained entities. It will be seen that in many cases the effects of group membership on intergroup behavior can hardly be considered without simultaneously taking into account the nature of the relations between the individuals' membership group and other groups which are interdependent with it. The final section of the review will summarize some of the studies concerned with reducing intergroup conflicts and tensions.

INDIVIDUAL PROCESSES IN INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR

One of the important trends of theory and research in the recent revival of interest in intergroup behavior has focused upon the role played by general cognitive processes in determining the individuals' "ideas" about ingroups and outgroups. This work is closely related to certain strands of cognitive theory which it applies to the functioning of stereotypes. We shall adopt Stallybrass's (1977) definition of a stereotype as "an over-simplified mental image of (usually) some category of person, institution or event which is shared, in essential features, by large numbers of people . . . Stereotypes are commonly, but not necessarily, accompanied by prejudice, i.e. by a favorable or unfavorable predisposition toward any member of the category in question" (p. 601).

From Individual to Group Impressions

The above title reproduces the title of an article by Rothbart et al (1978); both reflect the recent upsurge of interest in attentional processes as they affect the formation and functioning of social stereotypes. In this work the emphasis has been on individuals or events singled out for attention; in other words, the interest has focused upon the derivation or strengthening of stereotypes which are due to the salience, in certain situations, of infor-
This "availability heuristics" of certain items of information (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1973, Rothbart et al 1978) is assumed to have marked generalizing effects, the direction of inference being from the characteristics of certain individual members of groups to groups as a whole. In a similar way, the idea of "category prototypes" formulated by Rosch and others (e.g. Rosch et al 1976, Rosch 1977, 1978) is reflected in the search for the particular levels of these category prototypes which may affect the conception of the category as a whole. The "levels" may vary in the centrality of their impact upon the conception of a category, and once again the direction of inferences tends to be from individual items to a category which these items represent.

Rothbart et al (1978) summarized the general conception underlying much of this research. The focus of it is "on how people amalgamate their impressions of discrete individuals to form a perception of the group as a whole, and our theoretical emphasis will be on the cognitive mechanisms that enable us to distill relatively simple impressions from a complex stimulus array" (p. 238). It is possible to argue that this emphasis creates a break in the study of intergroup relations between psychological functioning and the social fabric within which this functioning takes place. On the other hand, this interest in the accumulation of individual impressions is itself part and parcel of the social context from which it derives. As S. E. Taylor (1981) wrote, "recent trends toward desegregation [in the United States] have resulted in the creation of a situation uniquely suited to testing the implications of distinctiveness. This situation is solo status. Solo status is the case in which there is one member of a different race, sex, or ethnicity in a group which is otherwise homogeneous on that attribute." It remains true, however, that this is only one of many social situations in which intergroup behavior and attitudes are displayed.

Rothbart et al (1978) were able to show that under high memory loads the assumed typicality of certain distinctive instances tends to be retrospectively overestimated. This is the case in the association of "extreme" individuals, such as would be one or a few members of a social minority in groups of mixed composition, with some forms of "unusual" behavior which would tend to be "unfavorable." As Rothbart et al pointed out, findings of this kind may be relevant to our understanding of the effects of mass media on the formation of negative stereotypes about selected minority groups. The studies point to selective memory retrieval of information as the locus of the process. There is, however, some evidence (Upmeyer & Layer 1974, Upmeyer et al 1976) that when a division into ingroups and outgroups is used as one of the independent variables, the stage of the assimilation of information about groups ("input accentuation") has a
stronger effect on selectivity than its subsequent retrieval ("output accentuation"). This evidence is congruent with some of the findings of later studies by Rothbart et al (1979) and by Howard & Rothbart (1980).

The effects on stereotyping of attention being directed to individual members of certain social groups who become salient because of their minority or "solo" status in a group of mixed composition have recently been the subject of a series of studies by S. Taylor and her associates (S. Taylor et al 1978, 1979, S. Taylor 1981).

This research is closely related to field studies (Wolman & Frank 1975, Kanter 1977) which showed that women who are on their own among men in relatively new professional settings, such as middle-level business managers or medical students in work groups, tend to be stereotyped in terms of a variety of traditional feminine roles. The opposite of this phenomenon, which indirectly confirms the "solo" findings, was described by Novarra (1980) in her report about recent pilot schemes in West Germany in which young women trained in "men's work," such as precision tool making, avoid much of the discomfort and/or stereotyping by being in female working groups which consist of no less than 20 members in any one firm.

The main findings on "solo" status are as follows: one woman in a group of men or one black in a group of whites leave a relatively "stronger impression"; the evaluations of that person are polarized as compared with the evaluations of the same person identified as belonging to the majority in the group, in the sense that both positive and negative evaluations become more extreme in the solo condition. The findings do not, however, apply equally to various social categories. For example, there is some evidence in the studies that blacks tended to be stereotyped whether they were solo or members of evenly balanced mixed groups. As to gender differences, little evidence was found that solo status led to stereotyping in terms of traits; there was, however, evidence of stereotyping in terms of roles.

S. Taylor (e.g. 1981) relates these findings to Rosch's views (e.g. Rosch et al 1976) about the "basic level" of category prototypes in the perception of objects (i.e. the objects which carry the most information about the category as a whole and are thus the most clearly differentiated from prototypes of other categories). She finds support in the work by Cantor & Mischel (1979), who applied the prototype ideas to the study of person perception, for her argument that the stereotypic aspects of person perception find their "basic" or "prototype" equivalent to object perception at the level of social roles rather than in other taxonomies. In other words, personality traits would be, on Taylor's argument, less important in these contexts than what people are assumed to be doing. There is, however, some evidence from Canadian studies (Aboud & D. Taylor 1971, Aboud et al 1973) that traits associated with ethnic stereotypes tend to be assigned more often
to the outgroup than to the ingroup, while the converse is true of role stereotypes. The conception about the "prototype" nature of role stereotypes may need to take into account the ingroup vs the outgroup target of stereotyping. The evidence reported by S. Taylor and her colleagues applies mainly to the stereotyping of women. Women as a disadvantaged social category present a number of similarities with other such categories; but the differences from other social categories (e.g. ethnic groups, immigrant populations, religious or political minorities, etc) are also important (e.g. Williams & Giles 1978). It is therefore fairly hazardous to generalize from data about women, "solo" or not, to other instances of social stereotyping.

The general conception that stereotypes accumulate as a result of focusing attention on unusual people or events is also at the background of the studies on "illusory correlations" reported by D. Hamilton (e.g. 1976, 1979, D. Hamilton & Gifford 1976). The studies showed that when certain actions were attributed to members of two groups in a design in which more information was provided about one of the groups, and the ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors was varied, the subjects "grossly over-estimated the extent to which the infrequent group... performed the 'uncommon' type of behavior" (D. Hamilton 1979, p. 63) whether the behavior was desirable or undesirable. As Hamilton argues, these findings have a general significance for social stereotyping, since members of minority groups often represent "infrequent" stimuli and therefore a conjunction of their relatively rare appearance with some of their actions lends itself to the construction of "illusory correlations" and thus to stereotyping.

Most of the work on stereotypes described so far follows Ehrlich's (1973) prescription (see above) that the aim of a social psychological theory of intergroup behavior should be to relate cognitive processes to interpersonal behavior. The result has been an impressive body of research which focused upon the accretion of information about individuals leading to the building up of stereotypic views about their groups. The underlying and clearly stated conception has been that the study of cognitive processes is both necessary and sufficient for the understanding of the attitudinal (or stereotypic) aspects of intergroup behavior (e.g. D. Taylor & Aboud 1973, D. Hamilton & Gifford 1976, Rothbart et al 1978, S. Taylor et al 1978, S. Taylor 1981).

We have been led to new insights about one specific intergroup social situation: small groups of mixed composition which include one or a few members of certain social minorities. As has been pointed out earlier, this particular situation does relate to some of the social realities of partial desegregation; but one must ask whether the research succeeded in justifying the two claims made for it: the sufficiency of the study of cognitive processes in intergroup stereotypes, and the demonstration of this sufficiency in the work about the cognitive salience of selected individuals.
Some doubts must be raised. Social stereotypes are by no means confined to situations in which members of a target group are unfamiliar. This is not to say that individuals do not sometimes create their stereotypes on the basis of a few contacts with members of outgroups. It is, however, improbable that the genesis of widely diffused intergroup stereotypes can be found in the social summing up of the cognitive effects of "rarity" or "unfamiliarity" or "singling out" of isolated individuals. In some ways the argument begs the question, since it fails to provide a rationale as to why some individuals are singled out as a basis for the formation of stereotypes and others are not. For example, it is unlikely that "solo" red-haired or fat persons in groups of "mixed" composition would generate widely diffused social stereotypes of "groups" of red-haired or fat people. The behavior of certain individuals often becomes relevant to the stereotype of their group because they are representatives of a category which has a preexisting social significance enmeshed with preexisting value connotations. Attention-focusing becomes important for stereotyping mainly when it happens in the context of these preexisting evaluative social differentiations and when it is determined by them. There is still no evidence that, outside of this context, attention-focusing on individuals who are in some ways "different" is a primary condition of the process of stereotyping.

GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR

The focus of the research just reviewed was on the question of how cognitive structures determine certain aspects of intergroup attitudes. In the present section, several trends of research will be considered which have adopted a different order of priorities. Group membership is here the starting point of the analysis which then considers various psychological processes which follow from that membership.

One of the classic examples is the concept of "ethnocentrism." Sumner (1906) was the first to use the term together with those of "ingroup" and "outgroup." In their wide-ranging review of theories concerned with ethnocentrism, LeVine & D. Campbell (1972) made the term "to cover both the ingroup-outgroup polarization of hostility and the self-centered scaling of all values in terms of the ingroup folkways" (p. 8). As they pointed out, for Sumner ethnocentrism was a "syndrome" in the sense that it encompassed "a number of (mutually related) attributes of social life"; it played a function in group formation and intergroup competition, and it was universal. LeVine & Campbell described and compared in their book a formidable array of sociological, anthropological, and psychological theories trying to account for ethnocentrism at various levels of explanation.
The Scope and Range of Ethnocentrism

The “universality” of ethnocentrism was one of Sumner’s basic assumptions. “Universality” is a notoriously slippery notion. As we can assume from common experience that ethnocentrism in its various manifestations is a widespread phenomenon, a useful empirical question is possible: what are the conditions which lead to an increase or decrease in ethnocentrism or even perhaps sometimes to its disappearance?

It is this clarification of the realities of ethnocentrism which was the aim of the most ambitious cross-cultural study to date on the subject. A large-scale survey of ethnocentric attitudes (LeVine & D. Campbell 1972, Brewer 1968, 1979a, 1981, Brewer & D. Campbell 1976) combined ethnographic, social psychological, and field-anthropological methods of inquiry. The C.C.S.E. (Cross-Cultural Study of Ethnocentrism) encompassed data from 30 ethnic groups in East Africa at a time when the region was undergoing rapid social and political changes, as well as from West Africa, Northern Canada, and some of the Pacific islands. Attachment to the ingroup was found in all the groups studied. But this was not related in any simple way, such as was posited by Sumner, to outgroup attitudes and intergroup differentiations. For example, value connotations of stereotypes about outgroups did not systematically vary with open intergroup conflict; such conflict was not, in turn, directly related to various measures of social distance; ingroup favoritism was “relatively independent” of outgroup attitudes, etc. In sum, “which differences are emphasized under what circumstances appears to be flexible and context dependent; this flexibility permits individuals to mobilize different group identities for different purposes” (Brewer 1981, p. 350).

A similar flexibility and diversity of ingroup attachments and outgroup attitudes was found in two other field studies which, in common with the C.C.S.E., were concerned with comparing a number of ethnic groups seen in their historical and sociocultural context. Klineberg & Zavalloni (1969) worked with samples of students from several African countries which were, at the time of the study (and still are), engaged in the difficult process of nation building within boundaries determined more directly by the recent colonial past than by the older tribal loyalties. Using samples and methods very different from those employed by the C.C.S.E., Klineberg & Zavalloni also found close relationships between the variety of group identities assumed by their respondents and the “different purposes”—tribal or national—which these identities served.

A similar point of historical transition to nation building has been reached in Indonesia whose population, consisting of 300 separate ethnic groups, was estimated in 1972 at 124 million. Jaspars & Warnen (1982) worked, using various types of questionnaires, with young people from
several of these groups. The main purpose of the questionnaires was to elicit descriptions and evaluations of ingroups and outgroups in Jakarta, where many of the ethnic groups live side by side, and in the original locations of the groups where this is not the case. As a result of salience of group membership, more significant in the mixed environment of Jakarta than elsewhere, ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination were more marked in the capital than in the provinces. More generally, "groups do not necessarily evaluate outgroups more negatively than their own group. They do, however, in general have a more positive view of themselves than other groups have of them" (Jaspars & Warnaen 1982). As in the C.C.S.E., the absence of a simple relationship between ingroup favoritism and outgroup attitudes is thus reported again in the Indonesian study. Jaspars & Warnaen related their findings to processes of social identity and social comparison which will be discussed later.

The Development of Ethnocentrism

The difficulties of organizing and conducting large-scale cross-cultural field studies on ethnocentrism, such as those described above, resulted in the fact that much of the data we have on ingroup and outgroup attitudes and behavior relating to ethnic, national, or racial groups originate from experimental or semiexperimental research on more easily available groups or subgroups in Western societies. These studies were generally concerned with eliciting children's identifications and preferences through inducing them to make choices between concrete stimuli (such as dolls, pictures, etc) representing their own group and relevant outgroups. The conclusions of the earlier research have been that at a very early age children from underprivileged groups tended to reflect the social consensus about the status and the image of their group by adopting outgroup identifications and preferences, while the majority children clearly showed ethnocentric attitudes (for recent reviews see e.g. Pushkin & Veness 1973, Milner 1975, 1981, P. Katz 1976).

These findings led to methodological controversies followed by many replications. In addition to invalidating simple notions about the "universality" of ethnocentrism, the data pose more specific questions about the stages of cognitive development underlying children's attitudes and concepts about ingroups and outgroups (e.g. P. Katz 1976, Williams & Morland 1976). They also raise issues connected with what appears to be the immense sensitivity, shown both by the "majority" and the "minority" children, to the surrounding "social climate" of intergroup differentials and evaluations.

There is little doubt about sensitivity. A good deal of evidence exists about children's early assimilation of the socially available systems of values
and preferences even in conditions where obvious interracial cues are not present. This is the case for the expression of preferences between foreign nations which seem to crystallize in children earlier than the assimilation of even the simplest items of factual information about these nations (e.g. Middleton et al 1970, Stillwell & Spencer 1973, Tajfel 1981, Chap. 10\(^2\)). There is also evidence from several European countries of the early acquisition of “liking” or “preference” for one’s own nation (e.g. Simon et al 1967, Jaspars et al 1973, Barbiero 1974, Tajfel 1981, Chap. 9). Evidence that in the case of lower status ethnic groups, neither acute intergroup tensions nor obvious visual cues are necessary for outgroup favoritism to make its appearance is also available from Israel and Scotland (Rim 1968, Tajfel 1981, Chap. 9).

The methodological debate about the validity of some aspects of the earlier findings concerned mainly the misidentification of “black” children with white figures presented to them (see Greenwald & Oppenheim 1968, Hraba & Grant 1970, P. Katz 1976, Williams & Morland 1976, Milner 1981). There was, however, little doubt from the earlier studies about the data concerning outgroup preferences.

In some of the more recent studies on children and adults (see Brigham 1971, Bourhis et al 1973, Fox & Jordan 1973, P. Katz & Zalk 1974, Giles & Powesland 1975, Berry et al 1977) the pattern of outgroup preferences so often documented in the earlier work on children was not replicated. Commenting on some of these studies, P. Katz (1976) wrote that “it is tempting to attribute such changes . . . to societal changes that have occurred over the past few years. The importance of black people’s developing pride in their blackness is certainly a factor” (p. 128). She added, however, that “there are several problems with the societal change interpretation” (p. 128), most of them arising from further replications in the late sixties and in the seventies of the earlier results showing outgroup favoritism. These reservations lost some of their strength after the elegant demonstration by Vaughan (1978a,b) of a direct relationship in New Zealand between indices of social change and the decrease of outgroup favoritism in Maori children. Vaughan’s data originated from four studies using very similar methods and conducted in several locations over a period of about 10 years. As Pettigrew (1978) wrote: “proud strong minorities are possible despite the ‘marks of oppression’ ” (p. 60). There is also supporting evidence for the effects of social change from two field studies on young adults conducted in Italy in 1963 and 1978–79 with similar methods and populations (Capozza et al

\(^2\)This is a reference to a collection of theoretical articles and empirical studies revised and edited as one volume. It will be used here instead of the original sources for the sake of brevity and convenience.
It was found that the self-stereotypes and reciprocal stereotypes of northern and southern Italians living in the north changed in the intervening period in accordance with what would be expected from changes in the social and political climate and conditions in the country.

Despite some evidence from the United States and New Zealand that racial minority children of various ages begin to shed the older patterns of "ingroup devaluation," there are also recent findings from elsewhere of its persistence. In addition to the work by Jahoda et al. (1972) and Milner (1973, 1975), there have been more recent studies in Britain (e.g. Davey & Mullin 1980, Davey & Norburn 1980) showing that Asian and West Indian children continue to express outgroup preferences. Some aspects of these studies may enable us to gain a further understanding of the phenomenon. Direct comparisons with the higher status groups are explicitly and directly built into the studies on ingroup devaluation. The recent work in Britain shows that the Asian children, although expressing outgroup preference toward the white majority, do it to a lesser extent than is the case for the West Indian children. Milner (e.g. 1973) suggested that this finding can be accounted for by more protection of their self-image offered to the children by the Asian than by the West Indian group, as the Asian immigrant communities in Britain preserve a stronger cultural, familial, linguistic, and religious separate identity than do the West Indians.

Social comparisons made by an individual may focus toward the ingroup or the outgroup. In the former case, the ingroup may provide a basis for the building up of a positive self-image, if it managed to preserve a system of positive evaluations about its "folkways," mode of life, social and cultural characteristics. When the group suffers at the same time from low status in the society at large, the strength drawn by its members from its internal and positive social identity may come into conflict with the negative evaluations from the "outside" whenever comparisons with the higher status groups become salient—as has been the case in the studies showing the outgroup bias of minority children. Results reported by I. Katz (e.g. 1973), based on data from the sixties about academic performance of black pupils in recently deseggregated schools, can be subsumed within the same process of social comparisons with the higher status outgroup. In Katz's research, the performance and the expectations of the black pupils were often lower than might have been expected from independent assessments of their potential ability. It is reasonable to assume that the growth of group self-respect in underprivileged minorities, closely related to socioeconomic, political, and psychological changes both inside the group and outside of it, would result in a corresponding decrease of ingroup devaluations and of low comparative expectancies.

But this is a long process in which sociopsychological transformations must be seen as the effects of socioeconomic and political change rather
than being in some way autonomous and determined by the vagaries of haphazard assimilation by individual members of minority groups. For the present, there is a good deal of evidence (see Tajfel 1981, Chap. 15) that members of groups which have found themselves for centuries at the bottom of the social pyramid sometimes display the phenomenon of "self-hate" or self-depreciation. It was one of the merits of the studies on ingroup devaluation in children to have provided an accumulation of clear and explicit data on the subject. The self-depreciation, relating to social comparisons with the outside world, leads to a variety of internal conflicts (e.g. Weinreich 1979), some of which achieve their resolution in seeking and finding responsibility for the social discrepancies in an external "locus of control," i.e. in the social system at large (Lao 1970, Louden 1978). Several of these conflicts are described in some detail in the extensive field study by Geber & Newman (1980) based on data about African high school pupils gathered some years ago in Soweto, the African township bordering on Johannesburg. As the authors wrote:

... the socializing agents and the wider society ... make competing demands on the Black high school pupil. The competitive school system encourages the adoption of achievement oriented behaviors, of skills and knowledge appropriate to a Western technological society. The wider society, implicitly in segregation and explicitly in the political ideology, insists on the recognition of separateness and inequality... The schools can dispense rewards in terms of skills, knowledge, and the qualifications necessary for advance. The society in turn can bar [their] use ... (p. 126).

There is no need to stress the links between the psychological conflicts inherent in this situation and the explosions of violence which shook Soweto during the 1970s.

**Intergroup Conflict and Competition**

The research on ethnocentrism took its point of departure in the individuals' group membership. This is also true of research on intergroup conflict based on scarcity of goods or resources for which the groups compete. There exists, however, another basis for competition in which, as Turner (1975) put it, the scarce resources have no value outside of the context of the competition itself. This is the case of groups competing to win a contest, to achieve higher rank, status, or prestige—the case of "social competition," as Turner (1975) named it. The conflict for the "scarce resources" of rank, status, prestige, or winning a contest is "realistic" when it is institutionalized, i.e., when it is explicitly defined as a contest or determined as such by the norms of the social situation. An example of this institutionalization of a conflict about "winning" are the studies by Sherif and his collaborators (see e.g. Sherif 1966); countless other examples are familiar from everyday
life. Although the distinction between “objective” conflict and “social competition” contains overlaps and ambiguities (see Tajfel & Turner 1979), its two poles define the range of the “realistic” conflict and competition which concerns us in the present section.

INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR A long-standing divergence of approaches to intergroup conflict and competition is perhaps best exemplified in the contrast between the work of Sherif on the one hand and the extrapolations from interindividual competitive games to intergroup conflict represented, among others, by the research of Deutsch (e.g. 1973). Sherif started from the structure of the relations between groups in conflict and treated the behavior of the members of the competing groups as dependent variables of the intergroup situation. His field-experimental methods were used later by Diab (1970), who was able to replicate most of Sherif’s results in a Lebanese setting.

The divergence of approaches just mentioned can be subsumed in a distinction between two hypothetical extremes of a continuum of social interaction: the “interpersonal extreme” defined as “interaction between two or more individuals which is very largely determined by their individual characteristics and the nature of the personal relations between them”; and the “intergroup extreme” defined as “interactions which are largely determined by group memberships of the participants and very little—if at all—by their personal relations or individual characteristics” (Tajfel 1979, p. 401). This second “extreme” is a paraphrase of Sherif’s (1966) definition of intergroup behavior quoted earlier in this chapter.

This definition leads to empirical questions concerning the special characteristics of intergroup behavior and its antecedents. Two of these characteristics seem particularly important: the first consists of the uniformities displayed by members of the ingroup in their behavior and attitudes toward an outgroup. This transition toward uniformity mirrors the transition from the interpersonal to the intergroup ends of the continuum as the behavior is increasingly determined by the reciprocal group membership of the constituent individuals. The second major characteristic of intergroup behavior, which also becomes more salient as the “interpersonal” extreme becomes more distant, is another kind of uniformity: the decrease in variability in the characteristics and behavior of the members of the outgroup as they are perceived by members of the ingroup. In this process, members of the outgroup become “undifferentiated items in a unified social category” (Tajfel 1981, p. 243). The phenomena of depersonalization, dehumanization, and social stereotyping which tend to increase in scope as and when intergroup relations deteriorate are no more than special instances of this wider principle of the increased undifferentiation of the outgroup. Some research relevant to this “undifferentiation” will be discussed later.
The antecedents of these two kinds of uniformity seem to fall into four large classes. They are: (a) social differentials in status, power, rank, privilege, access to resources, etc., when the group boundaries are firmly drawn and/or perceived as such (see Brewer 1979b) and when the social organization on which these differentials are based loses its perceived legitimacy and/or stability (see e.g. Turner & Brown 1978, Commins & Lockwood 1979a, Caddick 1980, Tajfel 1981, Chap. 13); (b) intergroup conflict or competition, not necessarily related to previously existing status differences, as was the case in the work of Sherif and many other experimental studies to date; (c) movements for change initiated by social groups which, as distinct from case a above, are not always related to impermeable boundaries between groups (e.g. D. Taylor et al 1973, Mugny & Papastamou 1976–77, 1980, Giles et al 1977, D. Taylor 1980); and (d) individually determined patterns of prejudice which have tended for a long time to occupy the center of the stage in much of the traditional research on the subject (see Ehrlich 1973 for a review).

The varieties of the “mix” of interpersonal and intergroup behavior are well exemplified in the recent review by Stephenson (1981) of research on intergroup negotiation and bargaining. Much of this research used to concentrate on the unfolding of interpersonal relations between the negotiators or generalized to intergroup negotiations the findings of the substantive body of work (see Pruitt & Kimme 1977) on interpersonal gaming research. Although negotiators do enter into personal relations which have their varied effects on the outcomes of the negotiating process, there are, as Stephenson (1981) argued, some very distinctive aspects to intergroup negotiations which can only be neglected at the cost of misinterpreting the nature of the relevant situations (also see Louche 1978). The most important feature of the situation is the fact that the underlying conflict between the groups which the negotiators represent has little to do with the negotiators’ interpersonal relations, even if those relations do affect the course of the bargaining. This becomes even clearer when, as in a field study by Stephenson & Brotherton (1975), the number of negotiators on each side is increased. It has also been found that clear intergroup differentiation may actually strengthen the interpersonal bonds between the negotiators (Batstone et al 1977) or at least make it easier for them to develop such bonds (Louche 1982). This does not mean that the intergroup conflict can thereby be eliminated or at times even reduced. In many situations, as Louche (1982) put it, “negotiation is not an alternative to intergroup conflict; it is one of the forms in which conflict is expressed.”

One of the most striking instances of the effects on interpersonal behavior of the structure of intergroup relations is also one of the earliest. In some of Sherif’s studies (Sherif & Sherif 1953, Sherif et al 1961), boys who had become friends before the “official” intergroup competition was started
were placed in opposing groups. Their subsequent behavior was affected by the intergroup conflict and not by their previous interpersonal attachments. There is also more recent evidence that the effects of groups membership can overwhelm the unfolding of interpersonal relations, or as Turner (1981) put it "that social groups seem to be more competitive and perceive their interests more competitively than individuals under the same functional conditions" (e.g. Dustin & Davis 1970, Doise & Weinberger 1972–73, Janssens & Nuttin 1976, Lindskold et al 1977, Brown & Deschamps 1980–81). There are also data showing that aggression or retaliation involving groups can be stronger in some conditions than is the case for individuals (e.g. Jaffe & Yinon 1979). But we must still await a great deal of further conceptual clarification and research in order to be able to specify the relative weight of interpersonal and intergroup determinants of social interaction in the enormous variety of situations in which both seem to play a part (see Brown & Turner 1981).

INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND GROUP COHESION This need for further clarification finds an example in what has been traditionally one of the central issues in the study of intergroup conflict. Does conflict promote greater cohesion inside the groups engaged in it? At the limit, can conflict create a cohesive group where only a loose structure existed before?

There exists a long tradition of positive answers to these questions. Reflecting the views of his times, Sumner (1906) wrote: "The relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what makes peace inside" (p. 12). Freud's views, expressed in various periods of his work, were not different. The early frustration-aggression theorists also agreed (e.g. Dollard 1937). The substantial consensus about the existence of this functional relationship does not seem to have weakened. Stein (1976) was able to conclude his recent review of relevant work in a number of social science disciplines by stating that:

... there is a clear convergence in the literature in both the specific studies and in the various disciplines that suggests that external conflict does increase internal cohesion under certain conditions ... The external conflict needs to invoke some threat, affect the entire group and all its members equally and indiscriminately, and involve a solution ... The group must be able to deal with the external conflict, and to provide emotional comfort and support to its members (p. 165).

Stein's statement, positive as it is, is also hedged with reservations. What are the "conditions"? What happens if all members of a group are not equally and indiscriminately affected by the conflict? Or if the group is unable to deal with the threat or to provide emotional support? Or when the consensus about threat, when it is dubious, cannot be transformed by
the leadership into an "authoritatively enforced cohesion" (Stein 1976, p. 165)?

These are perennial questions and it is not surprising that recent social psychological research continued to find no more than piecemeal answers to them. Some of this research has been concerned with the effects of increased intergroup competition on the positive evaluation of the ingroup or its products (e.g. Doise et al 1972, Kahn & Ryen 1972, Ryen & Kahn 1975, Worchel et al 1975, 1977); with loss of cohesion in cases of group failure (e.g. Diab 1970, Kahn & Ryen 1972, Worchel et al 1975); with subjective enhancement of ingroup qualities deriving from the motivation of individual members (see Hinkle & Schopler 1979 for a review). A good deal of useful data have been collected without achieving what would amount to a major theoretical breakthrough providing a new perspective on the old established functional relationship.

It is therefore interesting to find a dissenting voice. In a series of studies, Rabbie and his colleagues (Rabbie & de Brey 1971, Rabbie & Wilkens 1971, Rabbie & Huygen 1974, Rabbie et al 1974) found that intergroup competition did not create greater ingroup cohesion or affiliation than either simple coaction or cooperation between the groups. Squarely set in the Lewinian tradition (Lewin 1948) of the primary importance in intergroup phenomena of the "interdependence of fate," this work emphasizes the interdependence between the individuals and their groups, and consequently the importance —theoretically prior to intergroup conflict—of such variables as common fate, the anticipation and the nature of the interaction within the ingroup, its perceived boundaries and "entitivitiy," and the attitudes toward the outgroup based on the perception of the outcomes for the ingroup of the outgroup's actions (see Horwitz & Rabbie 1982).

This work requires further extensions and replications. It is potentially important not because it denies the existence of a relationship between ingroup cohesion and intergroup conflict—which it does not do—but because it considers this relationship as itself being the result of more basic processes. It therefore attempts to specify some conditions in which the relationship does not obtain, these conditions depending upon the relevance of the external conflict to the functioning of these more basic processes.

POWER AND STATUS IN INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR

The interpersonal-intergroup distinction is also relevant to issues of status and power.
Apfelbaum (1979) pointedly wondered about *une si longue absence* of power differentials between groups in the study of intergroup behavior. The complaint seems (in part) justified, when one considers the predominantly interpersonal emphasis in, for example, the social psychological chapters of the interdisciplinary compendium on power edited by Tedeschi (1974).

Nevertheless, Apfelbaum's strictures contain an element of exaggeration, as she does not take into account the abundant tradition of research on outgroup favoritism of underprivileged groups summarized earlier in this chapter. It remains true, however, that social differentials have been at the periphery of the interests of social psychologists; but in recent years some promising departures both in theory and research have been made. Four recent trends of research seem to move in this direction. They concern the functioning of minorities, the experimentally induced effects of intergroup power relations, the effects of status on intergroup attitudes, and the role played in intergroup behavior by the perceived illegitimacy and/or instability of social differentials.

A promising start in the research on minorities was stimulated by Moscovici's work (e.g. 1976) on minority influence, which stresses the innovating potentialities of minorities in distinction from the traditional emphasis on a one-way majority influence on minorities. The major determinant of minority influence is, for Moscovici, the unwavering consistency of its viewpoint which confronts the differing views of a majority. This work has now been extended to issues of intergroup relations in studies by Mugny and his collaborators (e.g. Mugny 1975, 1981, Mugny & Papastamou 1976–77, 1980, Papastamou et al 1980). An attempt is made in this research to achieve a synthesis of ideas about innovating minority groups with tendencies sometimes shown by individuals to protect their uniqueness and differentiation (Fromkin 1972, Lemaine 1974, 1975, Lemaine et al 1978, Codol 1975). This is expressed in intergroup behavior through actions aiming to achieve a distinctive group identity associated with positive value connotations (Tajfel 1981, Chap. 12, Turner 1981).

Mugny's work shows that in order to understand the functioning of minorities in intergroup situations, assumptions about a particular "behavioral style" such as consistency must be supplemented by an analysis of the effectiveness of *any* style as it relates to the intergroup situation. This view was confirmed in a recent field study by Di Giacomo (1980) conducted in a Belgian university. An active and consistent minority attempting to gain the adherence of the general student body to a protest movement failed in its endeavors because the wording and contents of its statements led to its definition as an outgroup by the majority of the students.

The recent work of Ng (e.g. 1978, 1980) on the social psychology of power provides an example of another synthesis which seems to be required. In its application to intergroup relations, this research draws on several
background conceptions. They include Mulder's theory of “power distance reduction tendencies” (e.g. Mulder et al 1971, 1973a, b) which is concerned with the conditions leading individuals who have little power to attempt an equalization with those who are more powerful; the effects of group membership on competition for power; and the conditions of social exchange (e.g. Thibaut & Kelley 1959) in which “exit” from a relationship (Hirschman 1970) is either more or less likely than attempts to change an existing social situation “from the inside.” One of the points of departure in Ng’s work is the acknowledgment of the simple fact that, as distinct from many interpersonal situations, real-life “exit” by a group from a multigroup structure is often extremely difficult if not impossible. Thus, in one of his studies Ng (1978) found that the strength of the attempts to change the power structure of a social relationship was not affected by a “social categorization that relies only on the social-evaluative force of positive social identity” (Ng 1980, p. 241). This was the case because of the structural constraints of the strongly stratified social setting. In the “no-exit” intergroup situations there is also stronger intergroup discrimination in the case of “property for power” (i.e. property which can be used for increasing the effective exercise of power over another group) than in the case of “property for use” (i.e. property acquired for direct use by its owners).

Status differences are one of the reflections of differences in power: differences in power are one of the determinants of relative status; and sometimes, when status confers power, these relationships may be reversed. The focus on ethnocentric variables sometimes led to a neglect of the role of the structural constraints of social situations, such as those exemplified in Ng’s (1980) work on power. The structural constraints of status are equally important in their psychological effects.

In an extensive field study, van Knippenberg (1978) employed engineering students from two Dutch institutions of higher learning of differing status and prestige. One of the conclusions which emerged clearly from a complex set of results was that the two groups presented what amounted to obverse mirror images in their evaluations of four clusters of group characteristics. Among these characteristics, “status” was evaluated more highly by the lower status group. As van Knippenberg (1978) pointed out, a functional view of these differences between the groups needs to be taken. It is in the interest of the higher status group to minimize the importance of consensual status differentials, and it may be in the interest of the lower status group to magnify them. Data on attitudes concerning status-related characteristics obtained from groups in other social settings point in the same direction: university and polytechnic teachers in Britain (Bourhis & Hill 1982); nurses of different grades in a hospital (Skevington 1980); pupils from vocational and grammar schools in Geneva (Doise & Sinclair 1973,
in a supplementary analysis of data by van Knippenberg & Wilke 1980); community workers in Italy differing in their professional identifications (Palmonad & Zani 1980).

These studies all point to an implicit conflict between ingroup-favoring tendencies and the acknowledged realities of social differentials in power, status, rank, or privilege. This conflict, in turn, reflects the fact that these differentials are often not accepted as immutable and legitimate. The perceived illegitimacy of intergroup differentials leads to a variety of consequences in the reciprocal behavior and attitudes of the groups involved. A classic study in this area is that of Lemaîne & Kastersztein (1972). In a field experiment conducted in a holiday camp and resembling in some ways the Sherifian situations, one of the two competing groups of boys was provided, at random but explicitly, with poorer materials for the building of a hut, the excellence of which was to determine the outcome of the competition. The underprivileged group built a hut of indifferent quality but surrounded it with a garden. This act of social creativity, preceded by secret conclaves of the ingroup, was followed by sustained attempts to legitimize the garden as an integral part of the competition in the eyes of the outgroup and the adult judges.

Other studies have shown that experimentally induced illegitimacy of intergroup status differentials increases ingroup-favoring bias. Turner & Brown (1978) found this to be the case for both higher and lower status groups in an experiment in which Arts and Science undergraduates were competing in a task involving "reasoning skill." Induced conditions of higher and lower status between the groups were based on manipulations of legitimacy vs illegitimacy and stability vs instability of status. The findings concerning the effects of instability were less clear-cut than was the case for illegitimacy. Commins & Lockwood (1979b) found that in groups of boys who were equitably or inequitably advantaged or disadvantaged in rewards for the quality of their performance, the inequitably disadvantaged groups showed the most ingroup bias in a subsequent distribution of points worth money between the groups, but the group which had inequitable advantage also showed ingroup bias. Brown & Ross (1982) and Caddick (1980) sharpened the issue by assigning, through their procedures, the responsibility for illegitimate advantage or disadvantage directly to the groups of Ss rather than having it imposed by the experimenters as was the case in the previous studies. In the Brown & Ross study, in conditions of "high threat" caused by the outgroup's defense of illegitimate differentials, both the higher and the lower status groups showed marked outgroup discrimination; the lower status group actually reversed the pattern of ingroup derogation which it had shown in the "low threat" condition. Caddick (1980) compared control situations in groups which showed
“high” and “low” performance on two tasks, and were rewarded accordingly, with situations in which outgroups were involved in creating an “illegitimate intergroup differentiation.” In “illegitimate” conditions both the higher and lower status groups differed significantly from the controls in their distribution of rewards; they maximized differences in favor of the ingroup.

Directly related to these effects of the perceived illegitimacy of social differentials is an important series of studies by I. Katz and his colleagues (e.g. I. Katz et al 1973, I. Katz & Glass 1979) on the “ambivalence-amplification theory of behavior toward the stigmatized.” These studies concern the consequences of a conflict experienced in the higher status group—i.e. by members of the white majority. The conflict stems from the discrepancy between accepted values and the treatment of racial minorities. Starting from Myrdal’s (1944) ideas about “the American dilemma” and some earlier evidence (e.g. Dienstbier 1970, A. Campbell 1971), I. Katz and his colleagues were able to show that inputs of information about blacks and Chicanos lead to a polarization of reactions toward them by members of the majority. This is so because, according to the authors, the attitudinal ambivalence “potentiates threat to self-esteem in situations of contact” (I. Katz & Glass 1979, p. 57).

Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior

Our discussion so far of intergroup behavior as a function of group membership revolved around two major themes: the interpersonal-intergroup continuum of social interaction, and the functional characteristics of “realistic” group conflicts (LeVine & D. Campbell 1972). The former of these themes will remain relevant to our present review of research on the effects of social categorization on intergroup behavior. As will be seen, these effects cannot be said to proceed directly from explicit conflicts between groups.

Social Categorization: Cognitions, Values, and Groups

In an earlier section of this review, cognitive research was reviewed which stressed the transition “from individual to group impressions” in the formation and functioning of stereotypes. An older tradition of cognitive research on intergroup stereotypes can be traced back at least as far as Allport’s (1954) insistence that the “selecting, accentuating and interpreting” of the information obtained from the social environment, which is found in stereotyping, must be understood as a special instance of the functioning of the process of categorization. An early study of D. Campbell (1956) drew attention to the enhancement of similarities within, and differences between, items in an array which could be assigned to the same or to different categories respectively. A transposition to the study of stereotypes of this
accentuation of intracategory similarities and intercategory differences (see Tajfel 1981, Chaps. 4, 5, and 6) was based on hypotheses concerning two functions of "social accentuation." The cognitive function, resulting in the accentuation of similarities and differences, was the utilization of the category membership of individual items for ordering, systematizing, and simplifying the complex network of social groups confronting individuals in their social environment. The value function resulted in a still more emphatic accentuation of these same similarities and differences when they were associated with subjective value differentials applying to social categories. This served to protect, maintain, or enhance the value systems applying to distinctions between social groups. Recent summaries of the earlier research can be found in Eiser & Stroebe 1972, Irle 1975, 1978, Billig 1976, Doise 1978, Stroebe 1980, Wilder 1981.

Recent evidence confirms the accentuation principles. For example, S. Taylor et al (1978), starting from a partial restatement of the earlier hypotheses, found that "as a result of [the] categorization process, within-group differences become minimized and between-group differences become exaggerated" (p. 779). Similar results were obtained by Doise et al (1978), working with Swiss linguistic groups, and Doise & Weinberger (1972–73) with groups of boys and girls. Wilder (1978a) found that members of a group were assumed to hold more similar beliefs than individuals not presented as a group and that the same pattern applied to future behavior as predicted by the subjects. Hensley & Duval (1976) reported an accentuation of assumed similarities to, and differences from, the subjects' own beliefs attributed respectively to members of an ingroup and an outgroup. Similar or related findings were reported in other studies (e.g. Allen & Wilder 1975, 1979, Snyder & Uranowitz 1978, Wilder & Allen 1978).

The social accentuation of intracategory similarities is not, however, a symmetrical phenomenon applying evenly to ingroups and outgroups. One of the principal features, discussed earlier, of intergroup behavior and attitudes was the tendency shown by members of an ingroup to consider members of outgroups in a relatively uniform manner, as "undifferentiated items in a unified social category." The endpoint of this process is the "depersonalization" and "dehumanization" of the outgroup which often occur in conditions of acute intergroup tensions. The incipient forms of this denial of individuality to members of the outgroup have been shown to exist in some recent studies. D. Hamilton & Bishop (1976) reported that in the early stages of an integrated housing project, the white residents knew the names of other white families but referred to black families in terms of their racial category. D. A. Wilder (unpublished manuscript) found that his Ss assumed a greater homogeneity of beliefs and attitudes in the outgroup than in the ingroup about a variety of issues unrelated to the criterion on which
was based the ingroup-outgroup division. Concordant findings about the
outgroup's greater perceived homogeneity were also reported by Linville &
Jones (1980) and Quattrone & Jones (1980).

The value and cognitive functions of social accentuation provide a basis
for the understanding of the structure and direction of biases in intergroup
attitudes and stereotypes, but they cannot tell us very much about the
contents of the groups' reciprocal conceptions. This is why the early de-
scriptive studies of social stereotypes (see Allport 1954) and the purely
cognitive studies need to be supplemented by a theory of the contents of
stereotypes, particularly as we know from historical and anthropological
evidence (e.g. Banton 1967, Mason 1970, LeVine & D. Campbell 1972) that
the diversity of patterns or types of intergroup stereotypes is fairly limited.
Conceptions of outgroups are generated in their social and historical con-
texts and then transmitted to individual members of groups and widely
shared through a variety of channels of social influence. At least three social
functions of these conceptions can be distinguished (Tajfel 1981, Chap. 7):
justification of actions planned or committed against outgroups; perception
of social causality, especially as it relates to large-scale distressing events
(such as inflation, unemployment, a lost war, etc) whose complexity needs
to be reduced to simpler proportions; and a positive differentiation of a
social group from relevant outgroups. This threefold framework is useful
in the integration of some recent research which relates to one or more of
these group functions. Thus, Billig (1978) and Guillaumin (1972) presented
extensive descriptions, based on data from contents analyses, of the "con-
spiracy theories" of social causation in which the evil intentions and actions
of selected target groups become the assumed "cause" of the ills befalling
society at large (see also Cohn 1967, for a parallel historical analysis).
Deschamps (1977), Hewstone & Jaspar (1982), and Pettigrew (1979) used
a number of relevant experimental studies (e.g. Deaux & Emwiller 1974,
Mann & D. Taylor 1974, D. Taylor & Jaggi 1974, Dion & Earn 1975,
Duncan 1976, Stephan 1977, Dion et al 1978, V. Hamilton 1978) to extend
the interindividual emphasis of attribution theory (e.g. Kelley & Michela
1980) in order to stress the importance of ingroup vs outgroup membership
in the kinds of attributions of responsibility that are made for favorable and
unfavorable events. This work is also relevant to the group functions of
"justification" and "causality" mentioned above. As Hewstone & Jaspar's
(1982) wrote, "in an intergroup context, attributions are made as a function
of the social group membership of both the actor and the observer. Thus,
social categorization is the key variable." Finally, the group "differentia-
tion" function is directly connected with the work on tendencies to achieve
a "positive group distinctiveness" which will be discussed below in the
framework of the C.I.C. (social categorization-social identity-social com-
parison) approach to intergroup behavior.
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND INTERGROUP DISCRIMINATION

Despite the accumulation of commonsense and research evidence that explicit intergroup conflicts and competition lead to intergroup discrimination, there have been indications that they are not the only necessary conditions. For example, in one of Sherif's studies (Sherif et al. 1961) boys came to the holiday camp in two separate groups. As soon as the groups became aware of each other's existence, and before the competition between them was institutionalized by the camp authorities, there was some evidence of the development of competitive ingroup-outgroup attitudes. There has also been other evidence (e.g. Ferguson & Kelley 1964, Rabbie & Wilkens 1971) pointing in the same direction, including studies showing that intergroup cooperation does not preclude ingroup bias (see Worcel 1979, Turner 1981 for reviews).

The question therefore arose about the minimal conditions that would create intergroup discrimination. In the first experiment in which a "minimal" intergroup categorization was introduced (Rabbie & Horwitz 1969), Ss were divided into two groups on the basis of being labeled "blue" and "green." It was found that discrimination between them only occurred when each of the groups shared some form of a "common fate," while this was not the case in the control condition where the blue-green categorization was the only criterion of intergroup division. These results were questioned later (e.g. Turner 1975, pp. 24–30) on the argument that the methodological criteria for an appropriate intergroup categorization were not met in the study.

Additional criteria were introduced in an experiment by Tajfel et al (1971), in which intergroup categorization was based on over- or underestimation of numbers of dots in clusters and on differing aesthetic preferences. In a subsequent experiment by Billig & Tajfel (1973), division into groups was determined by random tosses of a coin. In these experiments (and others) there was no social interaction either within or between "groups"; no instrumental links between the Ss' responses and their self-interest; the anonymity of group membership was preserved; and there was no previous hostility between the groups. The major dependent variable was the distribution by each S of points worth money between two other anonymous Ss who were either one from the ingroup and one from the outgroup, both from the ingroup, or both from the outgroup. The points were distributed on "matrices" which allowed an assessment of the relative importance of various distribution strategies employed by the Ss. The results showed clear and consistent evidence of bias in favor of the ingroup.

These results gave rise to several methodological controversies (see Billig 1973, Gerard & Hoyt 1974, Branthwaite et al 1979, Aschenbrenner & Schaefer 1980, Brown et al 1980, Turner 1980, Tajfel 1981). The finding that intergroup discrimination can be caused by a "minimal" social catego-
rization retains, however, a considerable robustness. A count made for this review results in a conservative estimate of at least 30 studies which used minimal or near-minimal categorizations with diverse populations of Ss, independent variables and dependent measures, and which all show ingroup-favoring bias (see Brewer 1979b, Brown et al 1980, Turner 1981, for some of the recent reviews).

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COMPARISON An intriguing aspect of the early data on minimal categorization was the importance of the strategy maximizing the difference between the awards made to the ingroup and the outgroup even at the cost of giving thereby less to members of the ingroup. This finding was replicated in a field study (Brown 1978) in which shop stewards representing different trades unions in a large factory filled distribution matrices which specified their preferred structure of comparative wages for members of the unions involved. It was not, however, replicated in another field study in Britain (Bourhis & Hill 1982) in which similar matrices were completed by polytechnic and university teachers.

The data on maximization of differences contributed to the development of the C.I.C. theory. The major assumption is that even when there is no explicit or institutionalized conflict or competition between the groups, there is a tendency toward ingroup-favoring behavior. This is determined by the need to preserve or achieve a "positive group distinctiveness" which in turn serves to protect, enhance, preserve, or achieve a positive social identity for members of the group (Tajfel 1974, 1981, Turner 1975, Tajfel & Turner 1979). "Social identity" is defined as "that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership" (Tajfel 1981, p. 255). In conditions in which social interactions are determined to a large extent by the individuals' reciprocal group memberships, positive social identity can be achieved, in a vast majority of cases, only through appropriate intergroup social comparisons. Thus, the positive or negative conceptions of a social group are seen as being primarily relational in nature. In the succinct statement by Commins & Lockwood (1979b): "The social group is seen to function as a provider of positive social identity for its members through comparing itself, and distinguishing itself, from other comparison groups along salient dimensions which have a clear value differential" (pp. 281–82).

A direct inference from these views is that a "minimal" social categorization exerts its discriminatory intergroup effects because it provides a way to enhance "positive ingroup distinctiveness." This is done through the creation of favorable comparisons with the outgroup for which the Ss use the dimensions of comparison which are available to them, as was the case
with the distribution matrices in the studies just described. This was the case in a study by Oakes & Turner (1980), who found direct evidence for increased self-esteem being related to the opportunity of engaging in intergroup discrimination.

There also exists a number of recent studies which show in various ways that an increase in the salience of group membership leads, through intergroup comparisons, to more marked ingroup favoritism. These studies used several independent variables, singly or in combination, such as: increasing the salience of an experimentally induced group membership through the mere presence of another group; using in a similar way social situations in which a long-standing “real-life” group membership was made more salient; comparing attitudes and behavior relating to “collections” of individuals showing similarities or differences with an imposition, in the same conditions, of explicit divisions between the individuals in terms of groups (e.g. Boyanowski & Allen 1973, Doise & Sinclair 1973, Hensley & Duval 1976, McKillip et al 1977, White 1977, Worachel et al 1977, Brown & Deschamps 1980–81, Doise et al 1978, McGuire et al 1978, Turner et al 1979).

This work has implications for Rokeach’s (1960, 1968) “belief congruence” theory of prejudice which derives from the view that prejudice is based on the assumption of dissimilarity in beliefs between oneself and members of outgroups rather than on socially derived value connotations which are directly associated with intergroup categorizations. The empirical issue can, however, be focused more specifically: if intergroup categorization and interpersonal similarity or attraction are pitted directly against each other, which of the two is more likely to prevail in determining attitudes and behavior? Allen & Wilder (1975) studied directly the interaction between similarity-dissimilarity of beliefs and ingroup-outgroup membership. Using a “minimal categorization” procedure, they found that ingroup favoritism persisted even when there was similarity of beliefs with members of the outgroup and dissimilarity with members of the ingroup. Billig & Tajfel (1973) reported that the presence or absence of a minimal intergroup categorization was a stronger determinant of favoritism shown by the Ss in their distribution of rewards to other people than was interindividual similarity or dissimilarity. In field studies on helping anonymous strangers, Sole et al (1975) discovered a steep increase in the extent of helping when the strangers could be unambiguously categorized by the Ss as members of the “we” group rather than just as being similar in some of their beliefs.

An inference from the C.I.C. theory is that in conditions of salient intergroup categorization, groups will tend to work harder at establishing their distinctiveness from the outgroups which are perceived as similar than from those which are seen as dissimilar. This is in direct contradiction to
the "belief congruence" view. There is some support for the C.I.C. prediction from three experimental studies. Turner (1978) found that in competitive situations, groups with similar values displayed more intergroup discrimination than groups with dissimilar values. In a study by Turner et al (1979) Ss were ready to sacrifice self-interest for a strategy maximizing ingroup-favoring differences when they were dealing with outgroups which were more directly comparable with the in-group. In another study (Brown, as reported in Brown & Turner 1981), attitudinal similarity between groups in conditions of intergroup cooperation did induce favorable attitudes toward the outgroup; but this did not apply to Ss who had been previously ascertained as being highly competitive. They were found to like similar groups less than dissimilar ones. In contradiction to all this evidence, D. Taylor & Guimond (1978) reported that in various conditions of increased salience of group membership, belief similarity was more important in determining the Ss' responses than group affiliation.

Thus, the issue still remains unresolved. The direction that needs to be taken by future research was well summarized by D. Taylor & Guimond (1978), who wrote that, as distinct from the procedures of their own study, "it will be important to manipulate important beliefs shared by members of a group and require Ss to make judgements about ingroups and outgroups on a collective basis" (p. 24).

An area of work which has proved sensitive to testing the C.I.C. interaction is that of the linguistic aspects of ethnic and national identity. There is a vast amount of evidence from history, anthropology, and political science that various forms of linguistic distinctiveness are perceived as a crucial mainstay in the revival or preservation of a separate ethnic or national identity. This has led in recent years to a considerable amount of research, conducted in many sociocultural contexts, which attempted to integrate sociocultural aspects of language use with the study of psychological intergroup processes. Several discussions and reviews of this work are now available (e.g. Bourhis & Giles 1977, Giles 1979, Husband 1979, Lambert 1980, Giles & Johnson 1981). The achievement by ethnic or national groups of "psycholinguistic distinctiveness" (Giles et al 1977) is equivalent to the "positive group distinctiveness" discussed earlier in relation to the C.I.C. processes. The nature of the existing relations between the groups determines the choice of one or more between a number of possible strategies which are available to an ethnolinguistic minority for coping with its disadvantages. When the boundaries between the groups are not firmly drawn, in the sense that access to the dominant language group does not present too much difficulty, a strategy of individual assimilation is often adopted (see Giles & Johnson 1981). Another individual strategy is that of "illegitimate" assimilation (Breakwell 1979, Tajfel 1981, Chap. 15) which
consists of concealing one's background or origin in the use of language as well as through other forms of concealment (e.g. changes of name, the “passing” of light-skinned blacks, etc).

These individual strategies differ sharply from group strategies which are sometimes determined by difficulty of access to the outgroup, sometimes by strong internal pressures for preserving group identity, and very often by a combination of both these conditions. The attempts to achieve positive group distinctiveness are translated here into various forms of linguistic “social creativity,” some of which are conceptually similar to the behavior shown by the disadvantaged group in the Lemaine & Kastersztein (1972) study mentioned earlier in this chapter. In some cases there is a positive reevaluation of the group's language or dialect (e.g. Bourhis & Giles 1977). In others, linguistic divergences from the outgroup are accentuated (e.g. Doise et al 1976, Bourhis et al 1979). In still others, this accentuation of divergence takes the form of intense efforts to revive the separate language of the group, as was the case, perhaps most dramatically, with modern Hebrew in Israel and with the corresponding attitudes widely shared in the national group (e.g. Seckbach 1974). Several similar examples from other national and ethnic groups can be found in the review by Giles & Johnson (1981). It has also recently been shown (see Giles & Byrne 1980) that these attempts to achieve or maintain a separate group identity in relation to outgroups can markedly affect the rate of progress and effectiveness of second-language acquisition in immigrant groups.

It would be an oversimplification, however, to exaggerate the ingroup's uniformity of attitudes and behavior in these psycholinguistic expressions of the push toward a distinctive ethnic or national identity. In this and other areas, multiple group membership, differences of individual positions within the group, and the salience of subgroup membership (Zavalloni 1972, 1973, 1975) determine a diversity of patterns. Any conceptual scheme can only account for a limited part of the variance. Its range of validity and the appearance of alternative patterns can be interpreted adequately only when the relevant psychological processes are looked at in conjunction with the study of their socio-cultural contexts.

THE REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP DISCRIMINATION

The term “discrimination” rather than “conflict” is used in the above title because referring to a reduction of intergroup conflict would imply adopting a standpoint about the results of the relevant work which appears to prejudge the fundamental issues: can it be said that this research has succeeded in giving us new insights about the reduction of the underlying
conflicts between groups, or is it more appropriate to consider it as applying to the reduction, under some conditions, of mutual discrimination between some members of groups in conflict? For the present there is no evidence that the first of these questions can be answered in the affirmative.

It cannot be said that great strides forward have been accomplished in recent years in our understanding of these issues. This is perhaps due to the fact that we still do not have a general integrating perspective. In a review of the work on the role of intergroup contact in prejudice and ethnic relations, Amir (1976) concluded that "despite a substantial amount of research . . . our theoretical understanding of what contact involves as a potential agent of change and what are the underlying processes is still very limited" (p. 289). This conclusion applies to the area as a whole. Among several strands of recent research which can be identified, three will be discussed here briefly as they represent changes of emphasis from earlier work.

**Intergroup Cooperation and Superordinate Goals**

Intergroup cooperation leads, as might be expected, to less discrimination than intergroup competition. However, Sherif's (e.g. 1966) early conclusions about the effectiveness of "superordinate goals" shared by the previously competing groups have been found to apply in a more limited way than he had originally envisaged. It has been pointed out (e.g. Tajfel 1981, Chap.14) that in the final stage of Sherif's study, when the two groups of boys worked together for the achievement of a common goal which neither of them could have achieved separately, their competitive conflict was over and there were no other criteria left to perpetuate their division into two groups. In other words, there are no reasons to assume that they have not come to feel as one group and that therefore their full cooperation need not be representative of other situations in which groups retain separate entities despite the occasional situations when they must work together for a common goal.

Experimental research on these issues has now been initiated by Worchel (Worchel et al 1977, 1978), who found that the salience of previously existing group identities strongly affected the conflict-reducing effects of subsequent intergroup cooperation, and that an interaction between these previous identities and the success or failure of the cooperation was also important. A recent review of these and other studies can be found in Worchel (1979).

**Intergroup Contact**

A large number of studies have also been conducted in recent years on the effects of interpersonal contact on the reduction of intergroup discrimi-
nation, particularly in situations of interethnic or interracial tension or conflict (see Amir 1976, Riordin 1978). Comparing recent work with earlier research in the fifties, Amir (1976) drew attention to two general changes of emphasis. The first consists of more attention having been paid recently to the attitudes and behavior of minority group members as compared with the earlier emphasis on the changes of attitudes in the high status majorities. The second major change could be described as a loss of innocence. In the earlier period, many investigators "sought and expected a reduction of prejudice" (Amir 1976, p. 285), and therefore they tended to select social situations in which these results might be expected to occur. There has been in recent years a large increase in research on everyday life situations, as a result of which, to quote Amir again, "a much larger percentage of studies report either no-difference findings, qualified results, or unfavorable changes" (1976, p. 283). This brings us to a conclusion similar to that reached by Diab (1978): whenever the underlying structure of social divisions and power or status differentials is fairly resilient, it is not likely to be substantially affected by piecemeal attempts at reform in selected situations of "contact."

Multigroup Membership and "Individualization" of the Outgroup

There is evidence from anthropological field studies that a certain amount of control of intergroup conflict and hostility has often been achieved in tribal societies through various methods of "crossing" the membership of groups, so that some individuals find themselves belonging to one group on the basis of one set of criteria and to a traditionally hostile group according to other criteria (e.g. LeVine & D. Campbell 1972). This "criss-crossing" can be achieved through, for example, various types of exogamous marriages with the result that a structure of social categories may obtain in which individuals who belong to categories A and B are further subdivided into categories AC, AD, BC and BD. Starting from this evidence and predictions which could be drawn from the social accentuation theory described earlier in this chapter, Deschamps & Doise (1978) conducted an experimental study in which "criss-cross" categorizations of the Ss were introduced in terms of two separate and overlapping criteria. They found that as a result there was a decrease in intergroup discrimination as compared with a dichotomous social categorization. Brown & Turner (1979) questioned the interpretation of these results and confirmed their own hypothesis that the reduction in discrimination was due to the cognitive difficulties of the "criss-cross" arrangements experienced by the children who acted as Ss in the previous study. There is, however, some tentative evidence that the "criss-cross" effects may be important. Commins & Lockwood (1978) su-
perimposed an experimentally induced transient categorization upon the important and pervasive Catholic/Protestant division in Northern Ireland and found as a result some decrease in the traditionally determined intergroup discrimination; but this did not reach statistical significance. The paradigm may, however, prove important for future research on the reduction of discrimination. As Commins & Lockwood (1978) pointed out, the "real-life" religious categorization in Northern Ireland is much more salient and powerful than the relatively trivial one which was experimentally induced, and stronger results remain possible when two equally powerful social categorizations can be made to overlap and compete.

The "criss-cross" categorizations attempted to break down the perceived homogeneity of the outgroup which, as was seen earlier in this chapter, is an important feature of intergroup behavior. A similar principle was used by Wilder (1978b) in a series of studies on the "reduction of intergroup discrimination through individuation of the outgroup." He found that when Ss who had been initially categorized into groups on "minimal" criteria were later informed that there was dissent within the outgroup about issues which were unrelated to the initial criterion for categorization, intergroup discrimination was less than in the condition in which the outgroup was assumed to be unanimous. As there was no interaction between the groups, nor was there any opportunity for members of the ingroup to form their own opinions about the issues involved, the decrease in discrimination seems a fairly "pure" effect of the decrease in the perceived outgroup homogeneity. The studies by Commins & Lockwood (1978) and by Wilder (1978b) point to the importance for future research of using "natural" situations in which the "criss-cross" and the "individuation" effects are present or can be introduced. If they can be replicated, they could provide a fresh approach to studies on the reduction of intergroup discrimination.

SUMMARY

This has been a selective review of several years of work in an area of research which contains an enormous range and scope of problems and has always defied attempts at neat and tidy integration. I was grateful to the editors of the Annual Review of Psychology for their encouragement to present a perspective of newly emerging trends rather than an encyclopedic compilation.

Such an endeavor must, however, result in a reflection of the author's judgments (and biases) as to what is more or less important. The present review was guided by the conviction that intergroup processes present problems which often need their own level of theorizing and research, and
that equally often it is not very useful to treat them in terms of extensions from research in which group membership is not a primary independent variable.

The early section of the review concentrated on research which emphasizes cognitive processes as being both necessary and sufficient for the understanding of the formation and functioning of social stereotypes. Important findings and conclusions have emerged from this research, but they are concerned with a fairly narrow range of intergroup situations. These conclusions do not seem able at present to provide generalizations to interactions between groups which are powerfully determined by conflicts and by value-laden social differentiations.

It seemed, therefore, important to stress that the study of intergroup behavior needs to achieve a synthesis of these attentional processes with the socially determined value connotations of divisions between human groups, and with an insight into the conditions in which relations between groups strongly determine the reciprocal behavior of the individuals involved. This is why most of the review was devoted to intergroup behavior seen against the background of group membership. Recent research on ethnocentrism, of which some cross-cultural and developmental aspects were summarized, led to the conclusion that this “umbrella concept” must be considered in its connections with the psychological aspects and effects of social stability and social change, and of the functions served by group affiliations. These functions were discussed in turn in a perspective stressing the conditions in which the behavior of individuals is closely related to their group membership rather than to their personal relations with other individuals, i.e. the “interpersonal-intergroup continuum.” This framework was then used to consider the relations between intergroup conflict and group cohesion and the differentials between social groups in status and power.

There can be no intergroup behavior without categorization into groups, i.e. “social categorization.” A section of the review was devoted to processes of intergroup discrimination which in some ways transcend the existence of explicit conflict or competition between groups. These processes seem to depend upon the contribution that group affiliation makes to the self-concept of its individual members, and to their subjective location in the social networks of which they are a part. The study of social identity and social comparison does not replace the need for an analysis of explicit conflicts and competition, but complements it. In the final section of the review, devoted to research on the reduction of intergroup discrimination, a very large amount of good research had to be omitted or selectively presented. This was so because we are still badly in need of an integration of this vast area of work. What we have at present is a long list of empirical statements varying considerably in their degree of generality, practical applicability, or theoretical significance.
It seems that the future will have to be much longer than the past in the field of intergroup behavior. The increasing global interdependence since the end of World War II has enormously increased the diversity and complexity of intergroup relations. The psychological study of these problems, which will manage to combine some of our traditional preoccupations with an increased sensitivity to the nature of social realities, is one of our most important tasks for the future.

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